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NEIL DAVIDSON, LOUISE A. JACKSON AND DAVID M. SMALE 
 
Police Amalgamation and Reform in Scotland: The Long Twentieth 
Century 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines shifting debates about police amalgamation and governance reform in 
Scotland since the mid-nineteenth century in the light of the creation of a single police 
service (Police Scotland) in 2013. From a proliferation of 89 separate police forces in 1859, 
the number had been reduced to 48 by 1949 and eight in 1975. Yet the move towards a single 
police service was far from inevitable, as comparison with England and Wales demonstrates. 
The idea of a ‘single’ or national force was mooted from the 1850s onwards in moments of 
unrest, disorder and emergency, but for most of the twentieth-century it remained anathema. 
For the Scottish Office and Home Office as well as for many police officers, the move 
towards larger policing units was seen as desirable on the grounds of economy, efficiency, 
and professionalization. Yet the assumption that ‘local’ control of police forces through 
municipal and county councils best enabled accountability and hence legitimacy remained 
intact until the 1960s, whilst the regional model set up in 1975 persisted for forty years. The 
article explores the reasons for this, focusing on the changing dynamics of the relationship 
between central and local government across the last 150 years. 
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On 1 April 2013 Police Scotland formally came into being as a single service replacing the 
former eight regional ‘legacy’ forces through which policing had been delivered since 1975.1 
Official rhetoric has steered clear of the idea of uniform ‘national’ policing, emphasising the 
aim ‘to keep people safe across the whole of Scotland’ whilst stressing the need ‘to keep local 
policing … at the heart of what we do’.2 The creation of the single service has been widely 
described by senior police officers as ‘the most significant change to the Scottish policing 
service in its history’.3 The genesis of police forces and constabularies in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries was a result of the ‘local initiatives’ of ‘local elites’ rather than 
intervention from the centre.4 The pull towards centralisation—or rather, the careful 
balancing act between centre and locale—can be dated to the Police (Scotland) Act of 1857, 
which compelled towns, burghs and counties to establish police forces. By 1859 there were 
eighty-nine police forces in Scotland. Yet almost as soon as they proliferated, calls for 
amalgamation were put forward by civil servants and senior police officers. The number was 
reduced to sixty-four by 1899, forty-eight by 1939, thirty-three by 1959, and then eight from 
1975 to 2013.5 Whilst retrospectively the trajectory appears to be an inexorable move towards 
ever increasing amalgamation, it would be ahistorical to assume that a single police service in 
Scotland was inevitable. The eight ‘legacy’ forces based in regional administrative areas were 
in place for four decades.  Moreover, as Table 1 suggests, there was significant stasis in the 
number of county constabularies between 1859 and the late 1940s. The decrease in the 
number of burgh police forces was steadier, but with reductions concentrated in 1930 and the 
1960s. We might, therefore, ask why it was that that the model of local burgh and county 
policing was sustained for so long?  
This article has three main aims. Firstly, it seeks to chart and contextualise shifting 
debates about police reform and amalgamation in Scotland since the mid-nineteenth century 
in the light of the creation of Police Scotland, identifying the arguments that were made both 
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for and against geographical consolidation, and examining who was articulating them within 
a public sphere. Secondly, given the current preoccupation with ‘local policing’ and the 
desire to retain it as an emphasis within a single service, it examines how the idea of ‘local 
policing’ was articulated in the historical past, and what was understood by it, both for those 
who supported as well as those who opposed greater amalgamation. Finally, it addresses 
comparative questions. As Clive Emsley’s work has shown, ‘the steady march of 
centralisation’ is equally apparent across the history of policing and governance in England 
and Wales in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.6 Yet in the twenty-first century its 
organisation has gone in almost diametrically opposed ways, with the continuation in 
England and Wales of some forty-three separate police forces and, in 2012, the creation of 
the elected office of Police and Crime Commissioner as well as the ending of the direct link 
between the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police through the introduction of the 
Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime in London. In England and Wales, therefore, the trend 
has been against further centralisation.7 The article will seek to comment on points of 
commonality and divergence between Scotland and other parts of Britain across the twentieth 
century, reflecting in particular on the dynamics of the relationship between the Home Office 
and Scottish Office. Whilst addressing these questions, the structure of this article is a 
chronological one as that which best enables the charting of continuity and change. It is not 
our intention to revisit the emergence and development of police forces in Scotland in the 
late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which has been comparatively well-charted in a 
range of doctoral studies and other works.8 Rather, we seek to fill a significant gap in terms 
of the dearth of research on the twentieth century. The evidence-base is largely archival, 
drawing substantively on officially generated files in the National Records of Scotland, as 
well as local and national newspaper coverage; nevertheless, reference is also made to 
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interviews with former police officers that touch on their experiences of regionalisation (the 
creation of the eight ‘legacy’ forces in 1975). 
 
Table 1: The Amalgamation of Police Forces in Scotland 1859-2013 
Year County Forces City/Burgh forces Combined Total 
1859 32 57 0 89 
1869 32 47 0 79 
1880 32 39 0 71 
1889 32 37 0 69 
1899 32 33 0 65 
1909 31 32 0 63 
1919 31 29 0 60 
1929 31 27 0 58 
1939 30 18 0 48 
1949 22 14 0 36 
1959 19 14 0 33 
1969 1 4 15 20 
1979 0 0 8 8 
1989 0 0 8 8 
1999 0 0 8 8 
2009 0 0 8 8 
2013 0 0 1 1 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the Inspector of Constabulary for Scotland, 1859-2013, House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers 
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Nineteenth-century contexts: Alfred List and David Monro 
The idea of a single policing body for Scotland has its origins in the nineteenth century, was 
largely grounded in fears of civil unrest and disorder in the Borders and Highlands (rather 
than rapidly urbanising areas), and was promoted by a new but small elite of highly 
influential professional policemen (including inspectors of constabulary). It failed to gain 
wider currency because of the liberal consensus amongst the political classes that associated 
such a centralising agenda with autocratic foreign regimes and because of the dissipation of 
any real threat of civil disobedience.  
In June 1853 the head of Midlothian Police, Alfred J. List, put forward a plan for ‘a 
uniform system of county police’ in evidence that he gave to the Select Committee of Police.9 
Having joined the Metropolitan Police as an original ‘Peeler’ in 1829, List had been 
appointed as the commanding officer of the first Scottish county police force of East Lothian 
in 1832, where he received praise for his success in introducing a ‘very efficient system of 
police’.10 In 1840 he had published A Practical Treatise on Rural Police and moved to lead 
Midlothian constabulary.11 This publication and his work in advising counties in the south of 
Scotland on the formation of their ‘new’ police forces ensured that he became the most 
influential writer and thinker on policing in nineteenth-century Scotland.12 List’s ideas for the 
consolidation of police forces were drawn from his experience of the difficulties of policing 
large populations of navvies working on the building of the railways and of ensuring public 
order with relatively few men.13 He looked back fondly upon his service in London where a 
large number of police officers could be assembled to deal with an emergency.14 A further 
factor, however, that shaped his plan for consolidation was the ability of people and 
communications systems to traverse administrative boundaries, an argument that came to be 
emphasised in the twentieth century as the development of motor traffic increased the pace of 
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transport further.  When List gave evidence to the 1853 select committee he advised that the 
four counties who had not yet formed police forces should be compelled to do so under a 
rural police act, because ‘there is no uniformity of action, in the case of escapees, or 
information being sent from one part of the county to the other’.15 List went on to outline the 
structure of a uniform policing system: 
 
Its governance should be under an officer attached to the Crown Agent’s office, with 
a sub for the north, and another for the south of the Tay; and as many counties are 
small, and others entirely rural, two or three should be united together for police 
purposes, under the charge of a superintendent or inspector; all orders or instructions 
to emanate from the chief constable, and periodic reports to be made by him to the 
Lord Advocate.16 
 
For List the system had three main advantages: economy of scale; consistency in approach; 
and a significant reduction in local interference. The last point was the most controversial in 
effectively proposing an elevation of a technocratic head of police and a diminution in the 
power of local elites: 
 
… I would not set aside the Commissioners of Supply, but I would not allow them to 
interfere with the men; they should have only certain duties to perform, and should 
not interfere with orders emanating from the head of the police.17 
 
List might have hoped that his reputation would ensure that he would be the obvious 
candidate for the role of chief constable of all the counties of Scotland. In making his case, 
however, he had over-stepped the mark in criticising those with whom his own position, 
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status and authority was bound up.  At a meeting of the (elected) Police Commissioners of 
the City of Edinburgh, List was described as ‘one of the leading witnesses in support of 
centralising opinions’ and likened to ‘some petty German prince … laying down the law to 
the Emperor of Austria or King of Prussia’.18  
 As Graeme Morton has carefully shown, municipal government in early nineteenth-
century Scottish burghs was seen as the protector of civic virtue, associational culture, and 
civil society in opposition to the model of a centralised authoritarian nation state. Yet centre 
and locale were bound together in a symbiotic relationship since statute law enabled local 
self-determination: ‘the centre gave powers to local government to do its bidding, but this 
approach was balanced and thereby sanctioned for the reason that local government in turn 
demanded its own powers from the state’.19 Police constables gained any legitimacy they had 
from their association with local civil administration and thence from the idea that municipal 
authorities were locally elected and thus directly answerable to local opinion. Central 
government, in turn, was dependant on locales for the regulation of public order. For Morton, 
municipal government ‘was suitably empowered by the central state to govern on its behalf 
and this maintained the legitimacy of each’.20 This equilibrium was reconfigured but 
maintained as a result of the 1857 Police (Scotland) Act which, whilst not introducing the 
single police force that List had hoped for, compelled towns, burghs and counties to form 
their own police forces, introduced a state grant amounting to ‘One Fourth of the Charge for 
the Pay and Clothing’, and created the post of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary for 
Scotland (HMICS).21 The inspector was ‘to visit and inquire into the State and Efficiency of 
the Police appointed for every County and Burgh’, and he was empowered to advise that the 
state grant be refused if a force was deemed inefficient.22 The Act referred to amalgamation 
by stating in section 61 that ‘Burghs may agree to consolidate their Police with County 
Force’; although it was expressed in terms of permission rather than compulsion, the potential 
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to withhold the grant on the grounds of ‘inefficiency’ could be used as leverage.23 In this 
way, then, centre and locale held a set of checks and sanctions against each other, including 
the sharing of the allocation of resources.  
From their appointment in 1859, HMICSs pressed for the amalgamation of small 
burgh forces with their surrounding counties or adjacent burghs. There was some early 
success in that five burghs (Dysart, Kirkcaldy, Musselburgh, St. Andrews and Wishaw) 
agreed to consolidate with their counties under the enabling clause of the new police act.24  
For first HMICS John Kinloch, operational efficiency meant having a ‘well-disciplined 
police’ that was effectively drilled, trained and properly paid. He was highly critical of small 
burghs of fewer than 5,000 population and who ‘in some cases had their town officers, 
lamplighters, scavengers (and in more than one instance, the sexton), sworn in as constables, 
dressed in a blue uniform, and exhibited to me as their “police force”’.25 As David Barrie has 
shown, two-thirds of burgh forces were deemed ‘inefficient’ upon their first inspection in 
1859 compared to only two of the thirty-two rural constabularies.26 However, the sanction of 
the grant was rejected by some burghs who attempted to remain relatively autonomous. 
Aberdeen and Dundee both declined to accept the grant even if the Inspector reported them as 
efficient, and Perth and Kilmarnock did not respond to Kinloch on the question of the grant.27 
Any re-balancing was subject to negotiation, avoidance or resistance.  Kinloch’s successor as 
HMICS, Charles Carnegie, wrote in 1869 that ‘Annan, Kelso, Kirriemuir and Maxwelltown, 
cannot be reported as having efficient forces’ and that ‘these small places should be 
compelled to unite for police purposes with their respective counties’.28 Yet the heavy hand 
of compulsion could not be wielded, and the tactics of persuasion and suggestion required 
careful diplomacy. In 1899 the next HMICS, Captain David Munro, wrote approvingly of 
creeping amalgamations, which would reveal the benefits of consolidation, whereby a chief 
constable was shared by two counties (for example Berwick and Roxburgh) or a county and a 
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burgh (as in the case of Renfrewshire and Bute and the burgh of Kinning Park).29 Fifty years 
after its formation the Inspectorate was still reporting that the large number of small forces 
were ‘not conducive to efficiency or economy’.30  
By far the most developed call for a ‘national’ police force came in 1886 from Munro 
in response to the crofters’ protests in Skye and Lewis over the shortage of grazing land.31 As 
Ewen A. Cameron has observed, those in positions of authority assumed that violent episodes 
had been exacerbated by Irish ‘agitators’, escalating both assumptions about its political 
significance and the orchestration of the response, which included the use of ‘coercive, as 
well as conciliatory, tactics’.32 To deal with the disturbances Inverness-shire Constabulary 
had more than doubled in size between 1880 and 1883, from forty to ninety-four officers.33 
However, in January 1884 a detachment of police officers had been driven away in a 
humiliating manner by crofters in Glendale, in the north of Skye. The involvement of the 
county police had simply reinforced already entrenched assumptions that they were simply 
the ‘agents of the proprietorial class’.34 The police failure also acted as a further impetus for 
Inverness-shire’s sheriff, William Ivory, to lead two military expeditions in 1884-5 and 1886 
to attempt to pacify the island’s crofters. Munro’s response was to propose to the recently-
appointed secretary of state for Scotland, Arthur Balfour, the setting up of a ‘Government 
Force’ with the country divided into police districts.35 In November 1886 he submitted a 
more detailed plan, in which all of the police in Scotland would be transferred to the Crown 
and commanded by a chief commissioner in Edinburgh. A large body of men could be easily 
assembled and sent to any area suffering similar disturbances, and the ‘erroneous impression, 
so prevalent, in the Highland counties especially, that the Police are the Landowners’ 
Servants, would be removed entirely’.36 Pay, conditions, promotions and police procedures 
could be standardised, a general superannuation scheme introduced, and the existing pattern 
of burgh and county forces would be transformed into fifteen county and five city areas. As 
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the disturbances petered out, so did the impetus for the plan and no government force was set 
up in the nineteenth century. What is significant, however, is that arguments for a 
professionalised, impartial (in relation to landholders and local elites), and nationally-co-
ordinated service had been put on the table. Between 1857 and the end of the nineteenth 
century the move to combine forces seemed to be gathering a slow momentum although it 
was not a one-way process: in 1888 the burgh of Broughty Ferry decided to leave the county 
of Forfar Police and set itself up as a ‘small separate force’ once again.37  
 
Burgh forces and country constabularies in the twentieth century 
Shane Ewen’s study of the police and fire services in Birmingham and Leicester between 
1870 and 1938 has explored cogently the fine lines of interaction between central and 
municipal government in the negotiation of resources and processes of decision-making. 
Despite the increasingly regulatory role of the centre, services continued to be organised and 
delivered at the local level and the power relationship between them is best characterised as 
one of ‘interdependence’ in the running of a ‘national local government system’.38 Networks 
that were personal, associational and professional ran across as well as along the local/central 
axes, binding as well as sometimes fracturing policy communities. In Scotland a further layer 
of complexity was clearly added by the creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 which, it has 
been argued, exercised a largely mediatory role in its early years, advising councils on their 
statutory duties.39 With the upgrading of the role of the secretary of state for Scotland in 
1926, relocation to Edinburgh, and the expansion of the civil service associated with it, a 
more interventionist role developed.40 If the Scottish Office was unlikely to act as a point of 
resistance to Westminster, it sought nonetheless to negotiate compromises that took Scottish 
particularity into account.  
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In addition to the tripartite relationship between Home Office, Scottish Office and 
local administration that was established by the interwar period, the decision-making process 
was shaped by a further set of groupings or constellations of interest, influence and authority 
that together constituted the policy community associated with policing.  Local authorities 
had formed their own associations and lobby groups (representing the royal burghs, the cities, 
and county councils). The Police Act of 1919, which enabled the secretary of state for 
Scotland to standardise pay and conditions, set up the (Scottish) Police Federation to 
represent the views of rank and file police officers. Similarly, in the same year the Chief 
Constables (Scotland) Association began to meet, with a representative of the Scottish Office 
in attendance and this was used as vehicle to discuss collaboration between forces (such as 
the sharing of training), and the interpretation of new guidelines as well as the sharing of best 
practice; an Association of Superintendents and Lieutenants was also established. Through 
the setting up of the Police Council, representatives of these policing groups were to meet 
with the inspectorate, secretary of state, and representatives of the local authorities to discuss 
changes to conditions of service. Thus 1919 saw the imposition of a consultative model. 
 The pressure to amalgamate into larger forces on the grounds of efficiency and 
economy was maintained from the centre (both Westminster and Edinburgh) in the years 
after the First World War. The 1919 Committee on the Police Service (Desborough 
committee), which had focused on pay and conditions (addressed in the 1919 Act), had 
recommended a reduction in the number of Scottish forces.41 The Local Government 
(Scotland) Act of 1929 had abolished eight small burgh forces and combined two pairs of 
county forces. In 1933 the Police Consolidation (Scotland) Committee (Ormidale committee) 
had proposed the gradual reduction of Scottish forces on the grounds of efficiency and 
economy to a total of fourteen. The areas covered were to be sufficiently small to allow 
senior officers ‘to visit all police stations at regular intervals, and so acquire and maintain an 
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intimate knowledge of local affairs throughout the whole of the district’; they were also 
shaped by existing sheriffdoms.42 It was suggested that Glasgow City, for example, should be 
amalgamated with Lanarkshire and the burgh forces within this area; Edinburgh would be 
amalgamated with the Lothians and Peebles. The Ormidale report drew attention to the 
current anomaly in which two police forces (the county and the burgh) sustained separate 
headquarters in the same town (this was the case in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Inverness, Ayr, 
Hamilton, Dumbarton, Stirling, Perth, Paisley and Inverness). Significantly, the Ormidale 
committee rejected the idea that Scotland should simply be divided into two or three districts 
along the lines of a ‘national’ force because ‘the present close association of the police with 
local affairs and local administration … no doubt helps to create a good and friendly 
atmosphere between the police and the public’.43  The recommendations were supported by 
the cities of Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee and Aberdeen, whilst county councils were split 
and policing groups remained neutral. However, fifteen of the nineteen Scottish cities or 
burghs had vociferously objected to the proposals and, through a deputation to the Scottish 
Office, had ‘made it clear that the Committee’s recommendations were quite unacceptable’.44 
This uncompromising position meant that the report was ‘pigeon-holed’ (as senior civil 
servant Charles Craik Cunningham put it),45 and only one attempt to bring about voluntary 
amalgamation was successful throughout the 1930s (the case of Dumfries).46  
This pattern of recommendations from the centre, resistance from municipalities, and 
reluctance to force the matter was broadly similar to the situation in England and Wales in the 
first part of the twentieth century. Emsley has commented that in terms of official rhetoric 
‘governments and civil servants continued to support the idea of local control of the police 
except in London’ (where the Metropolitan Police had always been subject to direct Home 
Office control) whilst attempting to develop tactics to undermine this.47 Attempts to 
encourage amalgamation in the 1930s were opposed by the Association of Municipal 
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Councils in England and Wales, leading to a backing down on the part of the Home Office 
given concerns about police-public relations. At the same time, however, collaborations 
between forces (including the sharing of training and other resources) were encouraged with 
some success, as the acceptable side of consolidation; ultimately this could be used as an 
argument as to why full amalgamation was the next logical step. 
In England and Wales the emergency situation created by the Second World War was 
a crucial motor for amalgamation; and it is here that Scottish divergence was apparent. In 
July 1942 new regulations were issued under the United Kingdom’s Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act authorising the secretary of state for Scotland as well as the home secretary 
(for England and Wales) to enforce amalgamations if these were seen as necessary for 
facilitating naval, military or air force operations. As a result twenty-six forces on the English 
south coast were amalgamated into six in 1943.48 Municipal authorities were temporarily 
appeased by the promise that this was for the duration of the war only. Nevertheless, many 
police officers themselves advocated ‘nationalisation’ of the police, showing a clear 
mismatch between those involved in operation duties and their employers.49 In Scotland civil 
servants were extremely concerned about problems of communication between small forces, 
which had been exposed as a result of two incidents in East Lothian. A training exercise in 
August 1941—involving two men posing as ‘Fifth Columnists’—had gone badly wrong 
when the men were allowed entry to East Lothian police headquarters, Haddington, with 
obviously forged identity cards although clear descriptions had been circulated beforehand. In 
early 1942 East Lothian police had failed to pass on information about a parachutist sighted 
in the area to neighbouring forces.50 HMICS Brigadier-General H. M. Dudgeon, who had 
looked into the matter, was of the view that problems were exacerbated by the difficulty of 
attracting high quality recruits to small burgh and county forces; and the creation of larger 
forces would create more opportunities for promotion and career development.51 In February 
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1942, therefore, the Scottish Office was carefully considering a proposal to reduce the 
number of Scottish police forces to eighteen, but there were concerns this would be ‘highly 
contentious’ given that ‘public opinion is [not] yet prepared to support the government in 
legislation to force consolidation on unwilling Police Authorities’ and thus ‘politically 
impossible’.52 Senior Scottish Office civil servants (including Cunningham) were convinced 
in theory that complete ‘nationalisation’, ideally on a UK basis, was needed (along the lines 
of the reorganisation already carried through for the fire service).53 Discussions had taken 
place with the secretary of state for Scotland, Tom Johnston, as to whether a case should be 
made for Scotland to be omitted altogether from the Defence (Amalgamation) Regulations on 
the grounds that it would neither be popular nor resolve broader problems. Whilst, therefore, 
the regulations were applicable across the UK, Johnston made it clear that they were likely to 
‘be a dead letter in Scotland’ and, indeed, no amalgamations resulted north of the border.54 
The debates concerning the Defence (Amalgamation) Regulations of 1942 provide 
clear articulations of the ways in which local policing was understood by those involved in 
municipal government in urban areas at mid-century and in the context of the war effort. In 
Scotland local councillors in Inverness Burgh galvanised themselves against what they saw as 
the centralising agenda of the Scottish Office when, in November 1942, it was suggested that 
the occasion of the resignation of the chief constable might be an appropriate opportunity for 
uniting with the county (Inverness-shire), arguing that ‘it was not democratic government to 
remove the powers of the local authorities’.55 The editor of the Inverness Courier and 
Advertiser argued that ‘The Highland blood is up … There’s need for increasing vigilance by 
local authorities over their rights and powers. They should not be overawed by the dictates of 
Edinburgh and Whitehall’.56 The Scottish Office proposal was for the appointment of the 
existing Inverness-shire chief to head up both police forces. HMICS Dudgeon complained 
that the press had been rabble-rousing, that he had been welcomed by ‘a very cordial 
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reception and a perfect hearing’ upon a visit a few weeks previously, and that the Scottish 
Office’s preferred candidate was ‘every inch a Highlander – born in Ross-shire, a Seaforth 
Highlander; his mother tongue – Gaelic’.57 The issue, however was not Highland credentials. 
It was the matter of rivalry between county and burgh (that had manifested itself in 
disagreement over education matters), and the principle of central interference. The elected 
representatives of the royal burghs continued to defend their ‘right to local government’ that 
had been forged in the nineteenth century, rather than expressing any desire for Scottish 
national government.58 It was significant that Inverness Burgh went ahead with the 
appointment of its own candidate as chief constable in January 1943 in what had come to be 
seen across Scotland as something of a test case. Rather than force the issue, Johnston simply 
approved the appointment.59 The legitimacy of central government (including the Scottish 
Office), particularly given concerns about morale in wartime, was still bound up with and 
maintained by its ability to empower municipal autonomy in Scotland. 
Effectively, then, the smaller municipal corporations had lost the argument in England 
and Wales as a result of the wartime amalgamations: the Police Act of 1946 single-handedly 
abolished a further forty-seven borough forces south of the border.60 In Scotland, however, 
the royal burghs had come out fighting. Whilst civil servants had attempted to use the 
occasion of retirement, resignation or death in service of chief constables to persuade the 
burghs to consolidate with adjacent counties, all suggestions had been ignored. As the Home 
Office began to make its plans for post-war legislation to retain powers to enforce 
compulsory amalgamation in 1944, Johnston instructed his civil servants to negotiate a 
middle course. Whilst he agreed with the home secretary (Herbert Morrison) that 
amalgamations ‘may be in the interests of efficiency’ he was ‘most anxious’ that this should 
be done through ‘voluntary agreement’ and that ‘compulsion should be used as a last resort.61 
In February 1945 a confidential note was sent out by the Scottish Home department to all 
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police authorities and associations asking for discussion of the procedures to be used to 
enable and ultimately, force, amalgamations: 
 
There is no intention of suggesting that power should be taken to create Regional 
Police Forces, still less that police functions should be taken over as a national 
service. His Majesty’s government are satisfied that it would be wrong to make any 
fundamental alteration at present in the traditional framework of the Police Service … 
It is also recognised that the maintenance of a separate police force in a particular 
county or burgh may well be a legitimate cause of local pride.62 
 
Police opinion was in favour of larger forces, and clearly accepted the argument that it would 
improve the status of police officers within a more professionalised service and thus the 
quality of recruits. With the exception of Charles Roy of Kilmarnock who sided with the 
oppositional stance taken in the burgh, the Chief Constables (Scotland) Association approved 
of the proposals. Similarly, lower ranks did not object to the possibility of amalgamation, 
although they asked that officers should have rights to remain within specific geographical 
locations rather than be transferred long distances against their wishes.  Amongst local 
authorities, the Association of County Councils was similarly in accord, as were the cities. As 
in the 1930s, however, the Convention of Royal Burghs voiced concerns about the threat of 
compulsion; the Lord Provost of Perth argued that ‘they were proud of the ancient burghal 
powers and privileges’ although they would be ‘glad to take over the policing of the 
counties’.63  
Clearly, if any form of amalgamation was to go ahead, the suggestion that one local 
authority was ‘taking over’ another would need to be avoided and, indeed, the notion of 
compulsion had to be handled with sensitivity.64 Rather than proceeding with a UK-wide bill, 
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a separate Scottish Bill was prepared and successfully enacted by a new secretary of state for 
Scotland in the Atlee administration, Joseph Westwood. Packaging the reform as part of the 
modern plan for post-war social reconstruction, he argued that: 
 
the mobility of criminals, to whom the existence of numerous police boundaries was a 
godsend, the increase of road traffic and of road accidents, which created problems 
requiring unified police control over relatively large areas, the increasing need for 
expensive technical apparatus and for creating specialised police departments, all 
made it essential to have reasonably large units of administration.65  
 
Furthermore, large forces would give police officers ‘wider opportunities of gaining 
experience and promotion’ as well as enabling economies of scale. When pressed in 
questioning by Scottish MPs at the committee stage, Westwood’s deputy, under-secretary T. 
Fraser, offered ‘an assurance that he did not intend to embark on any wholesale 
amalgamations’.66 Crucially, compared to the act for England and Wales, the Scottish 
legislation did not automatically abolish forces. The 1946 Police (Scotland) Act enabled two 
or more local police authorities working together to submit a voluntary scheme for 
amalgamation to the secretary of state for approval.  If satisfactory voluntary schemes were 
not forthcoming, then a proposal could be put forward by the secretary of state for 
amalgamation on the grounds of ‘efficiency’. This would then be the subject of a full public 
enquiry, and would require the approval of Parliament.67  
There were also differences between the Police (Scotland) Act 1946 and the 
legislation for England and Wales in relation to the organisation of local governance. In 
England and Wales an entirely new police authority—that was effectively autonomous of 
local councils—was to be created when forces were combined. In Scotland, however, a 
18 
 
slightly different model was adopted, that of  ‘the joint committee consisting of 
representatives of the constituent authorities, who remained the police authorities for their 
respective areas but whose function relating to police … were delegated to the joint 
committee’.68 Local authorities were to work together and in partnership (albeit one that had 
been reconfigured and hence enabled by the centre) rather than feel that policing had been 
taken out of their hands.  
A number of areas (nine in total) came forward with voluntary schemes (at the 
invitation of the secretary of state) that led to relatively easy consolidations by the late 1940s. 
These included schemes that led to: the creation of Dumfries and Galloway in February 1948; 
the unification of Berwick, Roxburgh and Selkirk in May 1948; the creation of a new police 
force for North-Eastern Counties in May 1949; the unification of Stirling and 
Clackmannanshire in March 1949; and the creation of Lothians and Peebles in 1950.69 
Acceptance of merger tended to come from counties, who were persuaded that there were 
significant advantages in terms of recruitment, the sharing of technologies, and improved 
systems of communication across large geographical areas and given the relative dispersal of 
population. In 1949, for example, when the new North-Eastern Counties Constabulary was 
created, local constituencies were reasonably satisfied that the relationship between police 
and community would not be undermined since ‘the village bobby will remain the backbone 
of the service’ and that there would be material benefits in terms of ‘greater resources, more 
mobility and no boundaries’.70 Arguably, in county areas, where individual constables were 
often isolated from each other but embedded within village life, it was the relationship that 
was forged though everyday encounters that was more important than formal structures of 
governance. Moreover, the role of the village constable had, since the late nineteenth century 
been concerned with largely administrative tasks that were peripatetic: attending sheep-
dippings, checking fire-arms licences, undertaking the twice-yearly census of vagrants. 
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Furthermore, the increase in road traffic as a policing activity had increased awareness of the 
connectednessof rural areas. This contrasted with the model of burgh policing at mid-century, 
in which beat patrol still centred on the fabric and furniture of the street (owned by the burgh) 
and on the protection of the private property of local businesses, tradespeople and property 
owners (from which the burgh council was drawn).71 
 
The case of Ayr Burgh 
Significant nodes of resistance were maintained in the burghs of Inverness, Motherwell, and 
Ayr, the town clerk of whom had informed Cunningham in June 1947 that they would ‘fight 
to the end against amalgamation’.72 The case of Ayr demonstrates the tactics that might be 
deployed by municipal authorities to resist central intervention. Throughout 1947 and 1948 
Ayr Burgh refused to discuss amalgamation (with Ayr County and Kilmarnock) and declined 
to attend meetings, effectively goading the secretary of state into using the powers awarded 
under the 1946 act. Mr Gordon Thomson KC was appointed to head a public enquiry, which 
took place in February 1949. The royal burgh was represented by counsel, Mr J. R. Philip 
KC, who called a series of witnesses to demonstrate that the burgh police force was efficient 
because of its current structure of governance.73 James Lowdon, who was seventy-three years 
of age and had acted as chief constable for the previous forty-six years, defended his track 
record as a pioneer in introducing new technologies such as finger-printing and photography 
early on, and in being one of the first to employ policewomen (in 1918); detection rates were 
‘very good’.74 The case was also made that policing in the burgh was highly specialised or 
particular because of the unique demography generated by the tourism associated with 
Burns’s cottage, the herring fleet, and the ‘racehorse crowd’ (which had necessitated the 
introduction of a local system of regulation for bookmakers).75 Finally, the case hinged on an 
argument about the significance of local autonomy in achieving police successes. The chair 
20 
 
of the local chamber of commerce told the enquiry: ‘I think they have attained their 
efficiency through being friendly with the local population’. He agreed that ‘confidence 
springs from the identification of the police with the burgh’ and ‘the fact that the townspeople 
know the man on the beat’.76 The issue of identity was picked up by the town clerk, who 
commented on the effectiveness of special constables during the recent war because there 
was a very strong ‘esprit de corps’ that was ‘associated with the Burgh community’ and ‘with 
the local character of the force’.77 
Whilst the inquiry was in process, the burgh’s counsel raised objections to the 
procedures: Philip had not been permitted to cross-examine the HMICS, Sidney A. Kinnear, 
and the view of Ayr County and of Kilmarnock had not been heard. Indeed, Thomson 
proceeded to recommend that the amalgamation scheme should go ahead without hearing the 
case in its favour. Ayr Burgh began appeal proceedings, culminating in a finding in January 
1950, by Lord Birnam in the court of session, that the inquiry (and thus the whole 
amalgamation process) was, indeed, ‘irregular’.78 Before the month was out, the Scottish 
Office had written to the three police authorities (Kilmarnock Burgh, Ayr Burgh and Ayr 
County) inviting them to submit a voluntary amalgamation scheme; unsurprisingly, the two 
burghs declined.79 Jaded by the Ayr experience, Scottish Office civil servants advised that it 
was unwise to pursue further compulsory proceedings against other belligerent areas 
(including Inverness Burgh and County, Lanarkshire and Motherwell and Wishaw, Perth 
Burgh and County) until ‘amalgamation of the three Ayrshire forces has been achieved’.80 
Indeed, the town of Motherwell had previously been policed as part of Lanarkshire 
from 1859 but the experience had been such an unhappy one that it had tried to set up its own 
force in 1914 (the Scottish Office had refused to allow this to go ahead during wartime). In 
1920 Motherwell and Wishawwere combined together for local government purposes and, as 
a result of extensive lobbying, successfully formed their own police force in 1929, which they 
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were determined to defend ‘to the death’.81 Whilst it was suggested that in Edinburgh a shift 
towards rejection of amalgamation (with Lothians and Peebles) had been orchestrated by the 
Progressives (in response to a central Labour administration), in Motherwell and Wishaw 
amalgamation was ‘unanimously opposed by progressive, Labour and Scottish National Party 
(SNP) candidates at ward meetings in the build-up to local elections’.82 The Ayr Burgh 
victory undoubtedly had a galvanising effect on other burghs. In April 1958 Hamilton town 
council decided to appoint its own chief constable despite sharing one with Lanarkshire for 
the past ten years and continued as a separate force until 1967.83 In Scotland no compulsory 
amalgamations took place in the 1940s or 1950s and, indeed, there was little impetus or 
appetite at the Scottish Office to press the matter in the wake of the Ayr Burgh case.  
However police reform continued as a matter of intense debate and discussion across 
the UK, culminating in the report of the 1962 Royal Commission on Police Powers and 
Procedures, which, amongst other recommendations, stated that something should be done 
about the ‘extreme case of the multiplicity of small forces’ in Scotland. ‘Very considerable 
further reduction’ was ‘urgently’ needed and only the four cities (Edinburgh, Glasgow, 
Dundee and Aberdeen) should remain as independent urban forces.84 In its evidence to the 
Royal Commission the Scottish Home Department had acknowledged that a reduction to 
nineteen forces was desirable but that this ‘would be bitterly opposed by the burghs’.85 
Moreover, the Royal Commission also carefully considered evidence for and against the idea 
of a ‘unified national police service’. Indeed, the police federations of Scotland, England and 
Wales were all in support of a regional or national service. Chief constables, however, were 
reluctant to endorse it (with the exception of Lancashire’s Colonel Eric St Johnston).86 
Ultimately the commission endorsed the idea of local control of local forces, stating that it 
was persuaded by ‘the wide concurrence of view among witnesses representing the central 
Government, the local authority associations and the police [ie. Chief Constables]’ that 
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‘police organisation based on local forces and administered by partnership between local and 
central government’ would ‘meet the needs of the time’.87  
In England and Wales the 1964 Police Act removed the powers to appoint, dismiss 
and discipline officers from watch committees (urban areas) and handed them over to chief 
constables (in Scotland this role was already undertaken by police chiefs). It also gave the 
home secretary further powers to force amalgamation, which were used by Roy Jenkins to cut 
provincial forces further from 117 to forty-nine in 1966.88 In Scotland civil servants were 
beginning to feel they looked ‘laggard’ in comparison and were instructed to re-open the 
files: ‘the chosen victim is Inverness – county and burgh’.89 Rather than attempt to introduce 
a new police bill for Scotland, the decision was made to use the arts of diplomacy on a case 
by case basis, with HMICS Andrew Meldrum, himself a former chief constable of Inverness 
Burgh, to play a key role in steering the process. In July 1966 secretary of state William Ross 
read out a statement announcing his desire for ‘a limited programme of amalgamation’ to 
reduce the total number of Scottish forces to twenty, which he hoped would be ‘brought 
about by negotiation and agreement’. Police authorities were to be encouraged once again to 
develop ‘voluntary’ schemes but public inquiry would be used if agreement was not 
reached.90 The feelings in Inverness Burgh had long been against a simple amalgamation with 
the county with whom it was described as ‘daggers drawn’ as a result of continued financial 
disagreements over education matters. By 1966, indeed, the town clerk ‘favoured 
nationalisation or regionalisation’ through amalgamation with the whole of the north of 
Scotland, given that similar structures were deemed to have worked well in the case of the 
fire service.91 Yet the secretary of state for Scotland refused to countenance this as ‘not in the 
public interest’ because he thought a police district covering the whole of the north would be 
‘too large’, suggesting that even in the late 1960s the Scottish Office was reluctant to move to 
more regionalised structures.92 At this point Shetland (Zetland Constabulary) and Orkney 
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were required to consolidate with Caithness (although Shetlanders argued that their transport 
links were more obviously with Aberdeen).93 Ultimately, in the case of both Ayr and 
Inverness, the Scottish Office bounced the burghs into amalgamation with their respective 
counties by taking the matter to inquiry, which it ensured was conducted judiciously this 
time. By 1968, the Scottish Office had finally achieved its objectives in reducing the number 
of police forces to what was deemed an appropriate level but the system of direct local 
control by police committees, albeit ‘joint’ ones uniting burgh with county, continued. 
Across the twentieth century, therefore, resistance overwhelming came from the royal 
burghs (although county constabularies also voiced objections). A strong sense of civic pride 
and identity was expressed through the rhetoric of democracy, in which it was argued that 
local police forces should be accountable to local people. Sense of ‘community’ was 
associated with local autonomy in opposition to the centralising state, and was articulated 
through sense of place. Moreover, local, meant ‘civic’. These beliefs—which were cultural 
and political—remained pretty much intact until the early 1960s. Supporters of amalgamation 
tended to make arguments that, in contrast, were financial and logistical. Arguably, the 
inability of the Scottish Office to resolve the debate resulted from the lack of agreement 
about its terms of reference. 
 
Regionalisation and beyond 
The final move towards regionalisation of the police service—and the creation of the eight 
forces that were to serve Scotland for the next forty years—was the not the result of 
discussions about the optimum geographical entities to deliver effective operational policing. 
Rather it was an effect of the broader strategy of local government reform which saw the 
abolition of separate local government status for burghs, counties, cities and districts in 1975 
with the creation of the new two-tier regional structure (of regional councils delivering major 
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services, underpinned by multiple district councils delivering local planning and 
improvements).94 Effectively, then, the very councils who opposed police reform were 
themselves abolished. With the representatives of rank and file police officers already on 
side, there was little concerted opposition to the move. Indeed Dumfries and Galloway, the 
smallest of the eight, continued in its existing form. There were some difficulties in the new 
Northern Constabulary (Highlands and islands) arising from disagreements between the 
Highland regional council and the three island authorities (covering Orkney, Shetland and the 
Western Isles) regarding their numerical representation on the region’s joint police 
committee.95 Indeed, this had frequently been a focal point of disagreement in the past when 
counties had amalgamated. It is perhaps significant, however, that the new Northern 
Constabulary encompassed precisely those areas that Inverness Burgh had put forward in 
1966. The only concerted opposition to police regionalisation came from the Scottish 
Borders. In 1946 Roxburgh, Berwick and Selkirk had refused to amalgamate with the City of 
Edinburgh, which then adopted a similar position of hostility. Thirty years’ later, feelings had 
not changed. In October 1974 the newly formed Borders Regional Council declared its 
intentions to form its own police force rather than sharing with the Lothians and Edinburgh, 
whom it felt it would be subsidising.96 Three MPs—the Liberal David Steel (Roxburgh, 
Selkirk and Peebles), Labour’s John Mackintosh (Berwickshire and East Lothian) and 
Labour’s Robin Cook (Central Edinburgh)—vowed to fight it in parliament.97 Ultimately, 
however, Steel’s amendment to the Local Government (Scotland) Bill was defeated in the 
House of Commons by 96-12 (with many members of the Conservative opposition, on whom 
he had counted for support, siding with the Labour administration).98 The arguments for large 
policing units were convincingly made by 1975, given the transformations that had taken 
place since 1960 in the methods and technologies of operational policing, including ever-
increasing specialisation and the computerisation of information. Arguably a regional or 
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national service had made little sense in an earlier era where information was held on index 
cards.99 In the case of Orkney and Shetland, it had made little sense until effective air and 
radio communications were possible. By the 1970s technological factors became pre-
eminent. 
As the evidence given to the Royal Commission suggests, it was the Scottish Police 
Federation—speaking on behalf of the rank and file—who most keenly embraced ideas for a 
regional/national service in the 1960s and into the 1970s. A motion was passed at the annual 
conference in 1966 advocating the ‘nationalisation’ of Scottish policing, whilst a Federation 
working party went on to propose a reduction to ten forces for the whole of Scotland (and 
which was not significantly out of kilter with the creation of the regionalised service).100 
However, this endorsement was to change as a result of the experience of regionalisation, 
particularly in the west of Scotland, where the new Strathclyde force encompassed the dense 
urban conurbations of Clydeside, the mining villages of Lanarkshire, and the rural areas of 
Argyllshire and islands such as Arran and Islay. Strathclyde’s first chief constable, Sir David 
McNee acknowledged there were teething problems given the tensions between the need for 
‘standardization’ and that of ‘flexibility’.101 These challenges were reflected in the Scottish 
Police Federation decision to drop its support for the creation of a single Scottish police 
service in 1976 (having endorsed this policy for the last fifteen years). The Federation 
secretary was reported as saying that ‘it would be a greater disaster than regionalisation has 
proven to be … We have lost out on conditions of service by changing from small units to 
much larger units … it is very hard to police an area like Mull and have the same policy in 
the East End of Glasgow’.102 Arguably, the matter was not helped by the decisions that were 
made to roll out what had been the Glasgow City model across the new Strathclyde policing 
area.103 Given the domination of the Federation by Strathclyde officers (on account of its 
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sheer size) it was the Strathclyde experience that was most closely mirrored in the 
Federation’s policy shift.  
Interviews with former officers who were serving at the time indicate that in the new 
Northern Constabulary, criticism of the regional structure was much less marked than in the 
central west of Scotland.104 In rural areas officers retained significant amounts of autonomy 
and discretion and their role continued to be that of a generalist; for them regionalisation 
brought greater access to resources and enabled them to call on those who were specialists 
when this was needed. While officers did find themselves having to move greater distances 
for new posts this was offset for many by the increased opportunity for promotion. In 
contrast, in urban areas of the central west of Scotland where policing was largely street-
based, officers had less autonomy, a more specific set of tasks and duties, and a more 
geographically defined area of responsibility.  While they still enjoyed a high level of day-to-
day discretion, they were more constrained by their role, meaning front-line working 
practices were more susceptible to alteration if and when bureaucratic structures and 
procedures changed.  Therefore, when Glasgow’s working practices were rolled out to the 
outlying areas of Strathclyde after regionalisation, the changes were always likely to be more 
substantial and more keenly felt than amongst their ‘Northern’ counterparts.  With the 
perception among many officers that a model of policing based on Glasgow City was 
unsuitable for other locales, the attempts to unify working practices were often met with 
grudging acceptance, and occasionally even outright resistance. To those less enthusiastic 
about these imposed changes, the newly formed force was disparagingly referred to as 
‘Strath-Glasgow’.105  However, as was the case in Northern, many officers appreciated the 
career benefits brought about by being in a larger force. The experience of regionalisation 
varied depending on the career trajectories of individual officers and the forces that they 
served in. The interviews do suggest, however, that the introduction of any new policing 
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model needs to be sufficiently flexible to recognise differences in local cultures and local 
needs whatever the larger structures, labels or identities that are formally set in place.  
 
Conclusions 
From the setting up of a Scotland-wide system of ‘local’ policing in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the desirability of a move towards a regional or national model was discussed and 
debated. The Victorian assumption that ‘local’ policing meant ‘local’ control through 
municipal and county councils as that which best enabled accountability and hence 
legitimacy was challenged but remained intact until around 1960. Whilst the control of local 
elites may have persisted in the dominance of particular classes as elected members of police 
authorities, the rhetoric of ‘the public’ was increasingly used to refer to wider democratic 
principles and to defend the status quo. For the Scottish Office (and Home Office) as well as 
for many police officers themselves, however, the move to much larger policing units was 
desirable on the grounds of economy, efficiency, and professionalisation, including the ability 
to pool resources, invest in shared specialised units, and offer greater prospects of promotion 
and career progression. The development of transport systems that made populations 
(including criminal ones) increasingly mobile was a further incentive.  For most of the period, 
however, the idea of a ‘national’ force remained anathema, its proponents making the case 
most emphatically in relation to periods of unrest, disorder and emergency, a strikingly 
different context from the creation of Police Scotland in 2013. 
 Whilst its trajectory was broadly similar, the pace of amalgamation was different in 
Scotland compared to England as a result of the pressure exerted by the royal burghs (as well 
as some counties and cities). In the nineteenth century the leverage that central government 
had been able to exercise was also different given the lower central grant: initially a quarter 
of expenditure compared to the Treasury contribution of a half that was enacted in England 
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and Wales in 1876. Whilst this had been equalised in Scotland after the First World War, the 
Scottish Office was acutely aware of its dependency on local government for the effective 
delivery of law and order. From the mid-1930s until the 1960s a series of secretaries of state 
for Scotland (and civil servants) used the tactics of suggestion and persuasion to try to shift 
the climate of opinion. Whilst party political rivalries reared their head at various points, this 
was more to do with factionalism and the flexing of tensions within the relationship between 
local and central government. Compulsion was to be used as a last resort, but there was 
considerable nervousness around doing so. The approach was often piecemeal and 
opportunistic rather than strategic, with the retirement (or occasional disgrace) of chief 
constables being seized upon to press for amalgamation with a neighbouring force.  
The final reduction to twenty and then eight forces was a result of the reconfiguration 
of local government, and is illustrative of the fact that the organisation of policing has tended 
to follow the organisation of local administration rather than any logic regarding the 
geographical needs or characteristics of operational policing. However, it can also been seen 
as a result of the intensification of technological change and the beginnings of a 
communications revolution that transformed operational policing itself. From the early 
nineteenth century to around 1960 urban policing had been delivered through the model of 
the beat constable who used foot patrol to make his presence felt on the streets, who was 
largely engaged in the protection of property and whose knowledge was personal, local and 
experiential. In contrast, the last thirty years of the twentieth century saw the shift to mobile 
policing units, the sharing of information through telecommunications and digital 
technologies, and the growth in concern about international and cyber-crimes.  
Whilst the ‘local’ continues to be a central focal point and priority, the emphasis from 
the 1970s onwards has been towards the idea of local community (and, indeed, pluralised 
communities that are both geographical and diasporic) rather than the formality of local 
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government, municipal boundaries and officialdom. Further local government reform in 
1996, which replaced the model of regional two-tier government with thirty-two unitary 
authorities meant that even the administrative logic behind the creation of the eight regional 
police forces was effectively lost, although they retained their cultural identities for a further 
twenty years. The political context that led to the creation of Police Scotland was certainly 
historically unique—as a policy opportunity that resulted from increased devolution and the 
election of an SNP government—although, like earlier proposals for reform, it was grounded 
in arguments about the need for economy and ever-greater efficiency.106 As this article has 
shown, the rapidity with which the single service was created was also completely 
unprecedented, given the procrastination and slow burn that characterised the move towards 
amalgamation across the previous 150 years.  
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